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Abstract  
A stage structured fishery model with three stages; recruits, immature fish and mature fish is 
formulated and utilised to analyse maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and optimal harvesting 
composition in a fishery with two heterogeneous fleets. The stage structured model developed 
bundles the age classes found in age structured models into stage classes based on their level 
of maturity, but also the pattern according to which they are harvested. Two fleets, high sea 
and coastal vessels, harvest respectively the immature and mature stages. The maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY) is studied in light of both perfect and imperfect fishing selectivity. In 
addition, we analyse the biomass loss of a sharing rule where the high sea trawler fleet is 
granted a certain share of the harvested biomass. The paper provides a theoretical extension to 
the literature on age structured models, and presents several new analytical results related to 
stage structured models which are supported by a numerical illustration inspired by the North-
East Arctic cod fishery. 





The use of age structured fishery models is common when studying optimal harvest 
compositions; that is, which of the population’s year classes and how much is it beneficial to 
harvest. Some recent publications on this include Tahvonen (2008), Skonhoft et al. (2012), 
Quaas et al. (2013), Diekert et al. (2010a; 2010b), Diekert (2013) and Skonhoft and Gong 
(2014). In line with the result of the well-known Reed (1980) paper, when the objective is 
maximum sustainable yield (MSY), the general finding is to prioritise the harvest of larger 
mature fish. As harvest costs generally differ between the vessel groups targeting different 
year classes, the outcome is more ambiguous when such costs are included. For instance, if 
the unit harvest cost is relatively high when targeting mature fish and relatively lower while 
targeting the young fish, the above result may be reversed (Skonhoft et al. 2012). The 
inclusion of dynamics, or the issue of selectivity, further complicates the outcome, see 
Hannesson (1975) and Tahvonen (2009). In line with Hannesson’s results Tahvonen finds 
pulse fishing to be the optimal strategy. Pulse fishing may however involve high social and 
private costs that are not accounted for (e.g., idle harvest capacity, work instability of fishers, 
etc.). Diekert et al., (2010a; 2010b) and Diekert (2013) also use an age structured model to 
find that it is optimal to spare the young, though their inclusion of gear selectivity as a control 
enable a steady harvest.  
In reality, however, fishermen, or fishing vessels, rarely operate with perfect gear selectivity, 
and thus they do not have the option to only harvest fish that are, e.g. eight years old. Instead, 
it may make more sense to characterise the population by stages where each stage class 
typically consist of several age classes. This is what is done in the present paper, which is 
motivated by the North-East Arctic (NEA) cod (Gadus morhua) fishery, the world’s largest 
cod fishery with a harvest of 864 000 tonnes in 2015 (Anon. 2016). The vessels exploiting the 
NEA cod fishery can be categorised as two fleets; the coastal fleet with conventional fishing 
gear and the high sea trawler fleet. Due to different gear, as well as restrictions on harvesting 
area, the coastal fleet mainly harvest the mature and spawning fish, typically comprising fish 
of six years and older, while the trawler fleet mainly harvest younger, immature fish, typically 
comprising age classes three to six. The main goal of our paper is to analyse the optimal 
harvesting composition of mature and immature fish under different conditions, and relate 
these findings to our construction of a stage model.  
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In the bioeconomic literature there are to our best knowledge few, if any, models aiming to 
analyse optimal harvesting composition in stage structured models. Caswell (2001, Ch. 4) and 
Getz and Haight (1989) study stage structured models, and derive the main differences in 
comparison to age structured models. However, both these books are mainly concerned with 
biological issues. Our model is analysed with different assumptions about fishing selectivity, 
and fleet sharing rules. The latter refers to politically determined rules concerning how the 
harvest is shared between various vessel groups. Currently the Norwegian share of the NEA 
cod is allocated between the trawlers and the coastal fleet according to the so-called trawl 
ladder; a sharing rule that, depending on the size of the TAC, determines the allocation of the 
TAC between the two fleets.  
A number of studies have analysed the population dynamics and fleet economics of the NEA 
cod fishery. Several of these studies discuss interactions and trade-offs between different user 
groups (as for example trawlers and coastal boats, different nations, gillnetters and trawlers, 
etc.). Sumaila (1997) use a game theoretic framework in combination with an age structured 
population model, to study cooperation and non-cooperation between the trawlers and the 
coastal fleet. The same system is analysed by Zimmerman et al. (2011) who find that, with 
size-dependent pricing, it is optimal to target larger (older) individuals combined with a lower 
harvesting rate. Using a type of prey-predator model for cannibalism Eide and Wikan (2010) 
examine a fishery targeting the mature stock with bycatch of immatures. With gear selectivity 
as a control, they find that although it would be optimal to reduce total fishing mortality, the 
share of immatures harvested should be increased. Using a two-stage biomass model 
Armstrong (1999) analyses the optimal harvest composition between the coastal and trawler 
fleet. She does not find any biological or economic justification for the structure of the trawl 
ladder.  
This paper only studies Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) fishing, or the dynamic 
equivalent, which we label Maximum Yield (MY) fishing. It is well known that MY fishing 
in equilibrium, or steady state, coincides with MSY fishing for zero discount rate. While this 
is, as indicated, a simplification compared to the maximum economic yield (MEY) problem 
where costs are included, and a narrow goal that does not account for social welfare or 
ecosystem services, our choice is also motivated by the fact that fishery managers frequently 
regard MSY as the relevant management goals. MSY is for instance, the goal set by the EU 
Common Fishery Policy (CFP) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
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which is ratified by Norway (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-1125_en.htm, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_fish_stocks.htm). 
See also the discussion in Wilen (2000). Within the given framework, we aim to find and 
characterise the optimal harvest composition, and to examine the driving forces behind the 
exploitation scheme, both with and without bycatch. The social cost in terms of biomass loss 
of applying a sharing rule for the two fleets is also examined. The paper provides several 
results concerning the harvest of populations subject to imperfect selectivity and sharing rules 
which in most cases will coincide what we find in age structured models. 
Section two gives first a brief overview of the Norwegian North-East Arctic cod fishery and 
in section three the stage structured biological model is formulated. Our notion of fishing 
selectivity is described in section four. Throughout the paper we implicitly assume a Baranov 
catch function for both fleets (see, e.g., Quinn 2003), indicating that the fishing mortalities 
always are below one. In section five, we first analyse the fishery assuming perfect harvesting 
selectivity, followed by section six where the case of imperfect selectivity is studied. In 
section seven a numerical illustration is provided, while we in section eight introduce the 
sharing rule where the trawler fleet is guaranteed a minimum fraction of the harvested 
biomass. The outcome here is also supported by a numerical illustration. Section nine finally 
summarises our findings. 
2. The Norwegian North-East Arctic Cod Fishery  
The North-East Arctic (NEA) cod is the world’s largest cod stock, with an estimated stock 
size of 4.2 million tonnes in 2015 (Anon. 2016). It follows that the stock is considered to be 
reasonably well managed, an achievement due to the two sharing nations Russia and 
Norway’s joint management effort (Eide et al. 2013; Armstrong et al. 2014).  In 2015 the 
TAC was 894 000 tonnes, and Norway receives about 45 percent of this, in fact the 
Norwegian fleet harvested and sold cod for over 500 million NOK in 2015. This harvest of 
NEA cod accounts for about one-half of the total Norwegian harvest in demersal fisheries, 
and in 2015 the average Norwegian demersal fishing vessel had an operating profit of about 
1,190 thousand NOK (http://www.fiskeridir.no/Yrkesfiske/Statistikk-
yrkesfiske/Loennsomhet).  That said, the fishery’s lack of realised resource rent suggests an 
inefficient harvesting pattern, both due to quotas above the scientific advice and a shift 
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towards the harvest of younger age classes (Steinshamn, 2005; Arnason et al., 2004; Ottersen, 
2008; Gullestad et al., 2015) 
The NEA cod stock is characterised by significant inter- and intra-annual fluctuations in the 
spatial and temporal distribution of stock biomass, biological growth and recruitment. During 
its life cycle the population annually migrates between Norwegian, Russian and international 
waters. Moreover, while the mature stock migrates towards the Norwegian coast for spawning 
Russian waters observe a higher frequency of immature cod (Armstrong et al. 2014). The 
harvesting follows a strict seasonal pattern, where the main season takes place during the first 
quarter of the year (Eide et al. 2013). While the Russian share is harvested entirely with 
ocean-going vessels, i.e. trawlers, the Norwegian fleet consist of both trawlers and 
conventional fishing gear, i.e. the coastal fleet. Figure 1 illustrates how recent catches (2005-
2013) are distributed between the two nations, and between the Norwegian trawler and coastal 
fleets, whereas Figure 2 exhibits how the total harvest is allocated between immature and 
mature fish. See Eide et al. (2013) and Armstrong et al. (2014) for a thorough description of 
this fishery with its related management institutions. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
While the catch of immature cod has been reasonable stable over the last decade, the amount 
of mature cod caught has been fluctuating. These fluctuations are mainly due to varying 
recruitments and fishing induced changes in the age-composition of the stock. In addition to 
the choice of gear, an obvious distinction between the trawlers and the coastal fleet is the area 
of harvesting; only under certain conditions are trawlers allowed to fish within the zone of 12 
nautical miles, and never within that of 6 nautical miles 
(https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/2004-12-22-1878/KAPITTEL_14#KAPITTEL_14). 
As a result, the two fleets target cod constituting different age compositions. While the high 
sea trawler fleet’s harvest consists of smaller and to some extent immature fish, the coastal 
fleet targets larger mature fish. The main season for both fleets is during the cod spawning 
season. 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 3 illustrates the fairly fixed maturation process which the individual cod exhibits, and 
according to the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (Anon. 2013), NEA cod 
 6 
may be regarded as immature when between the age of 3- and 6 years old. The minimum size 
of legal catches is 44 cm, a size that enables the legal harvest of almost the entire class of 
immature fish between four and six years.  
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE  
The cannibalistic behaviour of the NEA cod stock is well known. Bogstad et al. (1994) argue 
that the frequency of cannibalism in the NEA cod stock declined in the late 1970s, reaching a 
point where cannibalism contributed to less than 1% of the cod’s food consumption. 
According to Yaragina et al. (2009) cannibalism in the 1990s increased to a level comparable 
with the 1950s. Both studies find cannibalism to be strongly correlated with the abundance of 
young immature cod. On the other hand, there is more controversy concerning the correlation 
between cannibalism and the availability of the cod’s main source of prey, namely capelin 
(Bogstad et al. 1994; Yaragina et al. 2009). Wikan and Eide (2004) discuss cod cannibalism 
within the framework of a nonlinear stage-structured model and conclude that while 
increasing fecundity has a destabilising effect, cannibalism imposes a stabilising element in 
the growth dynamics of the cod stock. Additionally, cannibalism appears to be a significant 
source of mortality for young cod, and an important factor in explaining the rather weak 
functional relationship between spawning biomass and recruitment measured at the age of 
three years (Yaragina et al. 2009). Cannibalism is taken into account in our analysis by 
utilization of a peak-valued recruitment function (section three below).  
 
3. Biological model 
Our harvesting model utilises a generic biological model including three stages of the 
population’s life cycle. These three stages at time (year) t  are recruits 1,tX (year < 1), 
immature fish 2,tX  (1 ≤ year < 6) and mature fish 3,tX (6 ≤ year) which contributes to 
spawning. While the two latter stages are targeted in the fishery, recruits are not part of the 
fishable stock1. Recruitment is endogenous and density dependent, while natural mortality is 
                                                          
1 According to the Anon. (2013), a more realistic structure would be to categorise recruits as 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 < 3. 
However, this would have complicated the modelling significantly without adding very much new insights. 
Therefore, with our model assumption the fish remains as recruits for only one year. 
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assumed to be constant and stock independent for all three stages. In the single period of one 
year, three events happen in the following order; first spawning and recruitment, then fishing 
and finally natural mortality2.  
The number of recruits is first governed by the recruitment function: 
(1) 𝑋1,𝑡 = 𝑅(𝑋3,𝑡), 
assumed to be of the peak-valued Shepherd type (see numerical section seven for 
specification). The recruitment function is characterised by (0) 0R  , 𝑑𝑅/𝑑𝑋3,𝑡 = 𝑅′ > 0 for 
a small and medium sized spawning population, and ' 0R  when the spawning stock 
becomes so large that cannibalism dominates. The number of immature fish follows next as: 
(2) 2, 1 12 1, 22 2, 2,(1 )t t t tX s X s f X    , 
where 12s  denotes the proportion of the recruits that survive the one-year time period ( , 1)t t  , 
and moves into the next stage class, i.e. the immature fish class, at the beginning of period 
1t  . 22s denotes the proportion of already immature that survive and stays one more year 
within this stage class. Therefore, while 12s  indicates the proportion of the recruits that moves 
into the immature stage, 22s  represents the proportion of immature fish that remain in this 
stage one more year. This equation thus differs from the age model equivalent where the 
parameters would represent pure survival rates as everyone surviving would move on to the 
next age class. See the Appendix for more details. 2,0 1tf   defines total fishing mortality 
of immature fish. Finally, the number of mature fish is described by: 
(3) 3, 1 23 2, 2, 33 3, 3,(1 ) (1 )t t t t tX s f X s f X     . 
Here  𝑠33 is a pure survival rate whereas 𝑠23 also express transition from the previous stage. 
Moreover, it follows that 𝑠22 + 𝑠23 is the pure survival rate for immature fish as the 
                                                          
 
2 A more real life approach would be to let natural – and fishing mortality occur simultaneously throughout the 
year, as modelled by Beverton and Holt (1957). However, the simplifying assumption made here should not be 
detrimental to the model (see e.g. Skonhoft et al. 2012). 
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transitions are cancelled out. 3,0 1tf   is total fishing mortality for the mature stock. Notice 
also that Eqs. (2) and (4) differ from the age model equivalent as fishing of the young fish, 
here considered as immature fish, would have been omitted in Eq. (2). Eq. (3), which describe 
the relationship between the immature age class and the mature age class is notified as the 
spawning constraint. Eqs. (1) and (2) can be combined to express the recruitment constraint: 
(4) 𝑋2,𝑡+1 = 𝑠12𝑅(𝑋3,𝑡) + 𝑠22(1 − 𝑓2,𝑡)𝑋2,𝑡. 
Therefore, Eqs. (3) and (4) represent a reduced form model in two stage-classes, where both 
equations are first order difference equations3.  
With fixed fishing mortalities, the population equilibrium is defined by , 1 ,i t i t iX X X     (
2,3i  ) such that: 
(3’) 3 23 2 2 33 3 3(1 ) (1 )X s f X s f X     
and 
(4’) 𝑋2 = 𝑠12𝑅(𝑋3) + 𝑠22(1 − 𝑓2)𝑋2. 
Note that an internal equilibrium only holds for 20 1f  ; that is, in order to sustain a mature 
spawning stock, the entire immature stock cannot be harvested. With a Shepherd (or Ricker) 
type recruitment function, the recruitment constraint (4’) is depicted as in Figure 4. A higher 
fishing mortality of mature fish shifts up the spawning constraint (3’) in the 3X  - 2X  plane 
and hence leads to smaller fish stocks if recruitment initially is below its peak value. Higher 
fishing mortality of the immature fish 2f  also shift the spawning constraint (3’) up, but in 
addition it shifts the recruitment constraint (4’) down.  In this situation, more aggressive 
fishing also leads to lower fish stocks if recruitment initially is below its peak value. 
                                                          
3 It can easily be shown that this is a (locally) stable system for fixed harvesting rates as Eq. (3’) intersects with 
Eq. (4’) from below. See Figure 1.  
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However, somewhat surprisingly, it works in the direction of increasing the equilibrium 
proportion of the immature fish. In a harvest program with 30 1f   and 2 0f  , the 
equilibrium stock composition simply reads 2 3 33 3 23/ [1 (1 )] /X X s f s   . 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
4. Fishing mortalities and bycatch 
As indicated, we assume the stock is targeted by two fishing fleets utilizing different gear. 
While the trawler fleet is targeting the immature fish, the coastal fleet, using conventional 
gear, is targeting the mature fish at the spawning grounds along the coast of northern Norway. 
To a certain extent, the fleets might be able to influence the relative amount of bycatch by 
technical measures or spatial distribution of fishing activities (see, e.g., Beverton and Holt 
1957 and Clark 1990, and the more recent Singh and Weninger 2009). Moreover, by design, 
bycatch will be less of a problem in a stage structured model as opposed to an age structured 
one because the definition of stages introduces a less strict, though somewhat more realistic, 
picture of selectivity. Irrespective of this however, not seldom the catch is composed of 
species from different stage classes and hence there is ‘bycatch’4. Fishing mortalities are 
assumed to be governed by the Baranov-type catch function, thus indicating that the fishing 
mortalities in our model always will be below one5. While the intended fishing mortality rate 
is denoted by ℎ𝑖,𝑡 ( 1,2i  ), the bycatch of one stage class is assumed to be proportional to the 
intended harvest of the other stage class. Accordingly: 
(5) 𝑓2,𝑡 = ℎ2,𝑡 + 𝛼2ℎ3,𝑡   
                                                          
4 FAO defines bycatch as: ‘Bycatch will be used to refer to that part of the catch which is not primary target of 
the fishing effort. It consists of both fish which is retained and marketed (incidental catch) and that which is 
discarded or released’ (Clucas 1997). In the present model, all bycatch is assumed to be retained and marketed.  
 
5 Applying a Baranov catch function the coastal fleet’s intended catch of mature fish is formulated as 𝐻3,𝑡 =
𝑋3,𝑡(1 − 𝑒
−𝑞3𝐸3,𝑡). The coastal fleet’s bycatch of immatures is correspondingly 𝐵2,𝑡 = 𝑋2,𝑡(1 − 𝑒
−𝑞2̃𝐸3,𝑡). 𝐸3,𝑡  is 
effort of the coastal fleet, while 𝑞3 and 𝑞2̃ are the coastal fleet’s catchability coefficients for the target catch of 
matures and the bycatch of immatures, respectively.  With the similar structure for the trawlers, total fishing 
mortality of matures may be written as 𝑓3,𝑡 = 𝐻3,𝑡/𝑋3,𝑡 + ((𝐵3,𝑡/𝑋3,𝑡)/(𝐻2,𝑡/𝑋2,𝑡))(𝐻2,𝑡/𝑋2,𝑡), in which 
(𝐵3,𝑡/𝑋3,𝑡)/(𝐻2,𝑡/𝑋2,𝑡)  is 𝛼3,  and indicates that 𝛼3 ≤ 1 holds when 𝑞2 ≤ 𝑞3̃. Finally it follows that 𝑓3,𝑡 =
(1 − 𝑒−𝑞3𝐸3) + (1 − 𝑒−𝑞3̃𝐸2), and likewise for the total mortality of immatures.  
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describes total fishing mortality rate of the immature cod stock. Therefore, while ℎ2,𝑡is the 
fishing mortality caused by the trawler fleet, the coastal fleet’s bycatch of immature fish is 
defined as a constant proportion, 𝛼2 ≥ 0, of their intended catch of mature fish, ℎ3,𝑡. 
Correspondingly, 
(6) 𝑓3,𝑡 = ℎ3,𝑡 + 𝛼3ℎ2,𝑡   
describes total fishing mortality rate of the mature stock with 𝛼3ℎ2,𝑡 (𝛼3 ≥ 0) as the trawler 
fleet’s bycatch of mature fish. Intuitively, one may think the restriction 1i  , ( 2,3i  ) 
should hold. For the coastal fleet this implies that it has a higher catchability coefficient for 
mature fish than for immature fish. For the trawler fleet targeting the immature fish stock the 
opposite will hold. Moreover, it may be reasonable to assume that the coastal fleet has a finer 
degree of selectivity than the trawler fleer, i.e. 𝛼2 < 𝛼3 (Diekert et al., 2010b).  
In addition to targeting cod both fleets also harvest saithe and haddock and there are 
arrangements for additional bycatch of these species. While there are cases of Greenland 
shark being taken as bycatch by trawlers and some of the larger coastal vessels, the bycatch of 




pefisk/en). Due to the high mortality of discards the discarding of fish is illegal, and both 
fleets are in general subject to the same level of monitoring and enforcement. Any other gear 
contact externalities are assumed to be similar for the two fleets.  
5. Maximum yield fishing with perfect fishing selectivity 
5.1 Optimality conditions 
First, we study the maximum biomass yield (MY) problem with perfect fishing selectivity; 
that is, 0i  , such that , ,i t i tf h  ( 2,3i  ) from Eqs. (5) and (6). With 2w and 3w as fixed 
(average) weight (kg/fish) of respectively immature and mature fish, and where 3 2w w , the 
current harvested biomass (kg) reads 2 2, 2, 3 3, 3,t t t t tY w h X w h X  .  The maximum biomass yield 
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𝑡=0  , subject to the spawning - and 
recruitment constraints Eqs. (4) and (3), respectively. Additionally, initial stock sizes ,0iX  (
2,3i  ) have to be known. 1/ (1 ) 1    is the discount factor with 0   as the discount 
rate. The Lagrangian is formulated as  
𝐿 = ∑ 𝜌𝑡{(𝑤2ℎ2,𝑡𝑋2,𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
+ 𝑤3ℎ3,𝑡𝑋3,𝑡) − 𝜌𝜆𝑡+1[𝑋2,𝑡+1 − 𝑠12𝑅(𝑋3,𝑡) − 𝑠22(1 − ℎ2,𝑡)𝑋2,𝑡]
− 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1[𝑋3,𝑡+1 − 𝑠23(1 − ℎ2,𝑡)𝑋2,𝑡 − 𝑠33(1 − ℎ3,𝑡)𝑋3,𝑡]} 
with 0t   and 0t   as the shadow values (kg/fish) of imature and mature fish, repectively. 
Following the Kuhn -Tucker theorem, the first order necessary conditions (assuming 0iX  , 
𝑖 = 2,3) are: 
(7) 2, 2. 2 1 22 1 23( / ) / ( ) 0
t
t t t tL h X w s s         ;  2,0 1th  , 0,1,2,...t  , 
1, 0,1,2,...t  , (8) 
3, 3, 3 1 33( / ) / ( ) 0
t
t t tL h X w s       ;  0 ≤ ℎ3,𝑡 <
(9)
 2, 2 2, 1 22 2, 1 23 2,( / ) / (1 ) (1 ) 0
t
t t t t t t tL X w h s h s h             ,  1,2,3,...t   
and 
(10)  (𝜕𝐿 /𝜕𝑋3,𝑡)/𝜌
𝑡 = 𝑤3ℎ3,𝑡 + 𝜌𝜆𝑡+1𝑠12𝑅
′(𝑋3,𝑡) − 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠33(1 − ℎ3,𝑡) = 0, 𝑡 =
1,2,3 …  . 
The interpretation of the control conditions (7) and (8) are straightforward as they express 
simple marginal gain – loss relationships. Condition (7) states that the immature stock should 
be harvested until the marginal biomass gain of harvesting is less than or equal to the 
economically (  ) discounted marginal biomass loss, evaluated at the biological ( 22s and 23s
) discounted shadow prices. In other words, harvesting should continue until the value of the 
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last fish harvested is equal to the value of leaving that fish in the ocean. From the control 
conditions it also follows that, ceteris paribus, an increase in discounting reduce the marginal 
cost of harvesting and will thus lead to more aggressive harvesting. The same is also true for 
natural mortality, and the transition and survival parameters.  Control condition (8) is 
analogous for the mature stock. Eqs. (9) and (10) are the portfolio, or stock, conditions which 
steer the shadow price values. Rearranging Eq. (9) as
2 2, 1 22 2, 1 23 2,(1 ) (1 )t t t t t tw h s h s h        , it is evident that the number of immature fish 
should be maintained such that its shadow price equalizes its marginal biomass gain value 
plus the marginal biomass loss, evaluated at the biological discounted shadow prices. Stock 
condition (10) can be given a similar interpretation, but here there is also a direct effect of 
recruitment. A sufficient condition for optimality is that the Lagrangian should be jointly 
concave in the control and state variables. While this is difficult to prove, it should generally 
hold as long as the recruitment function is concave.  
Assuming it is optimal to only harvest the mature fish, condition (7) will hold as an inequality 
while condition (8) will hold as an equation. This leads to the condition 𝑤3/𝑠33 > (𝑤2 −
𝜌𝜆𝑡+1𝑠22)/𝑠23. Quite naturally, the average weight of the mature fish exceeds that of 
immature fish, 3 2w w . Due to the stage structure of our model, we also have 𝑠33 > 𝑠23. This 
contrasts with an age structured model where both parameters would be pure survival rates 
with little to no difference between them (again, see the Appendix for further discussion). 
With the baseline data we thus find 3 33 2 23/ /w s w s ,  and hence the shadow value of the 
immature stock is crucial when determining which stage class to harvest. In section 7.2, 
however, we can conclude that  𝑤3/𝑠33 > (𝑤2 − 𝜌𝜆𝑡+1𝑠22)/𝑠23  is fulfilled with the baseline 
parameter values. More specifically, the condition thus states that it is optimal to only harvest 
the mature stock, here utilized by the conventional fleet, when the marginal biomass gain of 
harvesting matures is greater than the marginal biomass gain of harvesting immatures, both 
adjusted for the probability of surviving until the next year. Additionally, the economic and 
biological discounted shadow price of not letting the immature individual grow for another 
period, adjusted for the probability that the individual will survive and transfer to the mature 
stage class, also has to be taken into account. Accordingly, when this inequality holds the 
trawler fleet should not fish at all; that is, 3, 2,1 0t th h   . In other words, under this 
assumption, exploiting the mature stock while leaving the immature stock unexploited will 
maximize the biomass yield. This is stated as: 
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Result 1: In our stage structured model with perfect fishing selectivity and where the biomass 
yield is maximized, it is optimal to only harvest the old and more valuable stage class.  
This result is in line with Reed (1980) and Skonhoft et al. (2012) which considered age 
structured models, but the result is more clear-cut in these age structured models because only 
pure survival rates are included. Notice also that the simple structure of our result is to some 
extent contingent upon the Baranov catch function where the total fishing mortalities are 
restricted from reaching one. With a Schaefer catch function and the possibility of fishing 
mortalities equal to one, there would be a set of different cases to consider. Nevertheless, 
harvest of the mature age class should still be prioritized with this harvesting technology. See 
Skonhoft et al. (2012) for an analysis and discussion. 
5.2 Transitional dynamics 
As the yield function is linear in the controls, economic theory suggests that fishing should be 
adjusted to lead the fish stocks to steady state as fast as possible; that is, Most Rapid 
Approach Path (MRAP) dynamics. However, the MRAP is not a regular one in our stage-
structured fish population because, among others, the steady state will be a corner solution 
with zero fishing of the immature stock. The stage structure implies that the population could 
be above that of the optimal steady state level for one stage class and at the same time lower 
than the optimal steady state level for the other stage class. Since fishing is confined to two 
stage classes, the MRAP may imply a large harvest in one period and small, or zero, harvest 
in the next.  
The harvest of the two stage-classes also needs to be considered jointly before the optimal 
steady state is achieved, because the population of both immature and mature fish affects the 
optimal harvest rate of the other stage class through its impact on the size of the spawning 
population. In our case with 𝑤3/𝑠33 > (𝑤2 − 𝜌𝜆𝑡+1𝑠22)/𝑠23 and only harvesting the mature 
stock, the proportion of the mature fish to be harvested will depend on the number of 
immature fish. If the number of fish in this stage is small, it may be necessary to reduce the 
harvest of the mature fish to obtain the desirable size of the spawning stock. On the contrary, 
if the number of immature fish is large, it may be necessary to harvest all or some of the 
mature fish even if the number of fish of the stage class is lower than the optimal steady state. 
In our numerical illustration (section seven below), we find with our baseline parameter 
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values and initial stock conditions that the harvest rate of the mature stock should gradually 
increase over time until steady state is approached.  
5.3 Steady state analysis and MSY 
In a steady state with constant harvest and stock sizes over time, the above first order 
conditions (7) - (10) with 3 21 0h h    reads: 
(7’)  2 2 22 23( ) 0X w s s    ;  2 0h  , 
(8’)             3 3 33( ) 0X w s  ;  30 1h  , 
 (9’)  22 23s s     
and 
(10’)  
3 3 12 3 33 3'( ) (1 )w h s R X s h       . 
From Eq. (8’), the spawning constraint shadow price is
*
3 33/w s   (superscript ‘*’ 
indicates optimal steady state values) while the recruitment constraint shadow price follows 
next from Eq. (9’) as
*
23 3 22 33/ (1 )s w s s   . According to these shadow values (kg/fish), the 
immature stock is more valuable (in the ocean) than the mature stock if
* *
3 33 23 22( / )[ / (1 ) (1/ )] 0w s s s        , or 22 23( ) 1/ (1 )s s      . However, 
somewhat surprisingly, this does not hold with our baseline parameter values. The main 
reason is that the survival rates do not represent pure survival rates in the stage model. These 




> 0. Concurrently, the optimal steady state mature fish 
stock 
*
3X  will always be below the peak value of the recruitment function. This implies that it 
is beneficial to restrict the size of the mature stock in order to curb cannibalism and omit 
negative marginal recruitment growth (see Figure 1). Intuitively, recruits taken by 
cannibalism represent lost yield for the fishermen, and thus yield/stock loss through 
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cannibalism should be minimized, pushing towards a smaller stock size of matures. This is 
stated as: 
Result 2: With a peak-valued recruitment and perfect fishing selectivity, the optimal steady 
state harvesting policy implies that the mature stock should be harvested such that 
recruitment growth always is positive.    
To some extent, Result 2 relies on the stage structure of our model where all mature age 
classes is collected into one single stage of mature fish such that only one harvestable class 
contributes to recruitment. When the size of the mature stock is determined, the immature 
stock size
*
2X  is defined through the recruitment constraint (4’) which becomes 𝑋2 =
𝑠12𝑅(𝑋3) + 𝑠22𝑋2 when 
*
2 0h  . The spawning constraint (3’), here as
3 23 2 33 3 3(1 )X s X s h X   , finally determines optimal fishing mortality of the mature stock, 
*
30 1h  . This condition implies that the immature – mature stock ratio must be within the 
range
* *
33 23 2 3 23(1 ) / / 1/s s X X s   . When inserting for the survival and transition parameters 
(see numerical illustration for parameter values) this ratio is confirmed as above one, and 
hence the steady state stock of immature fish, consisting of several age classes, will exceed 
that of mature fish irrespective of the size of the fishing mortality of the mature stock, also 
consisting of several age classes.  
The steady state comparative statics are presented in Table 1. As most of the effects are 
channelled through the expression for 3'( )R X  the valuation of the fish stocks, i.e., 2w and 3w , 
have no impact on optimal stock sizes, nor on optimal level of fishing activity, i.e. 
*
3 / 0ih w   (𝑖 = 2,3).  This is stated as: 
Result 3: The valuation of the fish stocks has no impact on the level of exploitation. 
While this result may be surprising, it is to some extent a result of the problem design where 
only one of the harvestable stage classes contribute to recruitment, and where it is the number 
of individuals, and not the size of the biomass that determines spawning, recruitment and 
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potential cannibalism6. In addition, we may recall that the weight difference, 𝑤3 > 𝑤2, 
already has been included to determine which stage class to harvest.  
As expected, the higher the discount rate, 𝛿, the greater the slope of the recruitment function 





3 / 0X    . At the same time, the size of the immature stock 
*
2X  reduces while 
fishing mortality
*
3h increases to restore equilibrium. More aggressive fishing and lower 
standing biomass as a result of a more myopic policy are in line with the standard fishery 
model (the ‘Clark model’; Clark 1990), but here this effect is present simultaneously for two 
fractions of the stock. Higher survival rates, which increase all of the combined survival and 
transition parameters in our stage structured model, work in the opposite direction and hence 
indicate less aggressive harvesting and higher fish density. Moreover, while fertility and the 
fertility parameters have no direct impact upon the harvesting decision through the control 
conditions, these parameters will definitively influence the exploitation pressure and the fish 
abundance as they affect the slope of 3'( )R X . For example, we find that a higher value of the 
parameter indicating maximum recruitment increases 
*
3X  . For details, see the numerical 
illustration.  
Table 1 also includes the effects on optimal yield, 
* * *
3 3 3Y w h X  , which unambiguously 
increases with a more valuable mature stock as both stock and harvest rate are unaffected, 
* * *
3 3 3/Y w h X   . On the other hand,  
*
2/ 0Y w    as the immatures are left unexploited. 
The optimal size of the standing biomass,
* * *
2 2 3 3B w X w X  , is influenced by the stock value 
with 
* *
3 3/B w X    and 
* *
2 2/B w X   . The discount rate affect yield through the optimal 
stock size as well as optimal fishing mortality. However, these effects work in opposite 
directions and the sign of 
* * * * *
3 3 3 3 3/ [ / ) ( / ) ]Y w h X X h          is ambiguous. The 
expected relationship is certainly negative, i.e. * / 0Y    , and this is confirmed 
numerically.  As expected, we also find * / 0B     as both stocks are reduced in response to 
a more myopic harvesting policy.   
                                                          
6 Consider the case with a biomass determined recruitment, then the slope of the recruitment function would be 
𝑅′(𝑤3𝑋3), which is constant and determined by the survival rates and discount factor (main text above). 
Consequently, any change in 𝑤3 must be balanced by an equivalent change in 𝑋3 to restore the steady state.  
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TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE  
With 1  , or 0  , and where the steady state hence describes a Maximum Sustainable 






∗). Therefore, we also have higher stock sizes, *3 3
msyX X and 
*
2 2
msyX X . 
Accordingly, *
3 3
msyh h will hold.  We may also expect 
* * *
3 3 3 3 3 3
msy msy msyY w h X Y w h X   , but 
this is as indicated difficult to prove. Nevertheless, the MSY standing biomass will certainly 
exceed that of the optimal steady state standing biomass, 
* *
3 3 3 3
msy msyB w X B w X   . 
6. Maximum yield fishing with imperfect fishing selectivity 
As indicated, bycatch will be less of a problem in a stage structured model as opposed to an 
age structured one. However, including bycatch can still be considered as the more realistic 
scenario, and thus we now proceed to study the case of imperfect selectivity, i.e., 2 0   and 
3 0  . With Eqs. (5) and (6) and bycatch the biological constraints (3) and (4) read: 
(11) 𝑋3+1,𝑡 = 𝑠23(1 − ℎ2,𝑡 − 𝛼2ℎ3,𝑡)𝑋2,𝑡 + 𝑠33(1 − ℎ3,𝑡 − 𝛼3ℎ2,𝑡)𝑋3,𝑡 
and 
(12) 𝑋2,𝑡+1 = 𝑠12𝑅(𝑋3,𝑡) + 𝑠22(1 − ℎ2,𝑡 − 𝛼2ℎ3,𝑡)𝑋2,𝑡, 
respectively. Though no longer assured by the Baranov production functions, we assume the 
fishing mortalities remain below one such that 0 ≤ ℎ2,𝑡 + 𝛼2ℎ3,𝑡 < 1 and 0 ≤ ℎ3,𝑡 +
𝛼3ℎ2,𝑡 < 1. If it remains optimal to only utilize one fleet this will definitely hold. When the 
sharing rule is introduced in section 8, the condition is somewhat dependent on the proportion 
of bycatch, though the numerical illustrations indicate that it holds. The Lagrangian of the 
maximum yield problem now reads  
𝐿 = ∑ 𝜌𝑡 {(𝑤2𝑋2,𝑡(ℎ2,𝑡 + 𝛼2ℎ3,𝑡) + 𝑤3𝑋3,𝑡(ℎ3,𝑡 + 𝛼3ℎ2,𝑡)) − 𝜌𝜆𝑡+1[𝑋2,𝑡+1 −
∞
𝑡=0
𝑠12𝑅(𝑋3,𝑡) − 𝑠22(1 − ℎ2,𝑡 − 𝛼2ℎ3,𝑡)𝑋2,𝑡] − 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1[𝑋3,𝑡+1 − 𝑠23(1 − ℎ2,𝑡 − 𝛼2ℎ3,𝑡)𝑋2,𝑡 −
𝑠33(1 − ℎ3,𝑡 − 𝛼3ℎ2,𝑡)𝑋3,𝑡]}. 
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The first order conditions with 0iX   (𝑖 = 2,3) are:  
(13) (𝜕𝐿/𝜕ℎ2,𝑡)/𝜌
𝑡 = 𝑋2,𝑡(𝑤2 − 𝜌𝜆𝑡+1𝑠22 − 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠23) + 𝑋3,𝑡(𝑤3 − 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠33)𝛼3 ≤
0; 0 ≤ ℎ2,𝑡 < 1, 𝑡 = 0,1,2, … , 
(14) (𝜕𝐿/𝜕ℎ3,𝑡)/𝜌
𝑡 = 𝑋3,𝑡(𝑤3 − 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠33) + 𝑋2,𝑡(𝑤2 − 𝜌𝜆𝑡+1𝑠22 − 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠23)𝛼2 ≤
0; 0 ≤ ℎ3,𝑡 < 1, 𝑡 = 0,1,2, … , 
 (15)    (𝜕𝐿/𝜕𝑋2,𝑡) /𝜌
𝑡   = 𝑤2(ℎ2,𝑡 + 𝛼2ℎ3,𝑡) − 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜌𝜆𝑡+1𝑠22(1 − ℎ2,𝑡 − 𝛼2ℎ3,𝑡) +
𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠23(1 − ℎ2,𝑡 − 𝛼2ℎ3,𝑡) = 0, 𝑡 = 1,2,3, …  
and 
(16)  (𝜕𝐿/𝜕𝑋3,𝑡)/𝜌
𝑡 = 𝑤3(ℎ3,𝑡 + 𝛼3ℎ2,𝑡) + 𝜌𝜆𝑡+1𝑠12𝑅
′(𝑋3,𝑡) − 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠33(1 − ℎ3,𝑡 −
𝛼3ℎ2,𝑡) = 0, 𝑡 = 1,2,3 … . 
We assume 3 33 1/ 0tw s     and 2 23 1 22 23 1/ / 0t tw s s s     . Combined, these yield
3 33 2 23 1 22 23/ / /tw s w s s s   , which exactly corresponds to the perfect selectivity condition 
for the sole harvest of matures (section 5.1 above). Further assume that, in spite of imperfect 
selectivity, it is still optimal to only use the coastal fleet such that condition (13) holds as an 
inequality while condition (14) holds as an equation, i.e., 1 > ℎ3,𝑡 > ℎ2,𝑡 = 0. Thus, from Eq. 
(14) 𝑋2,𝑡(𝑤2 − 𝜌𝜆𝑡+1𝑠22 − 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠23) = −𝑋3,𝑡(𝑤3 − 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠33)/𝛼2,  and together with Eq. 
(13) we have that – 𝑋3,𝑡(𝑤3 − 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠33)/𝛼2 + 𝑋3,𝑡(𝑤3 − 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠33)𝛼3 < 0. This last 
inequality implies−1/𝛼2 + 𝛼3 < 0, or 2 3 1   . Given that 3 33 2 23 1 22 23/ / /tw s w s s s    
holds, we hence find that 3,0 1th  and 2, 0th   is consistent with 2 3 1   . Therefore, with  
2 3 1    as a restriction on the degree of bycatch, it remains optimal to only use the costal 
fleet, targeting the mature fish, to exploit the fish population. This is stated as: 
Result 4: With bycatch, but restricted degree of bycatch and 2 3 1   , it is still optimal to 
utilize only the coastal fleet.  
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We may have, 𝛼3 > 1 and ‘high’ bycatch of mature fish by the trawler fleet. However, as 
long as this is counterbalanced by a ‘small’ amount of bycatch of immature fish by the coastal 
fleet with 𝛼2well below one, the present bycatch restriction will hold. Applying only the 
coastal fleet may also be present with the opposite bycatch situation; that is, with 2  ‘high’ 
and 3 ’low’. Notice also that the above result prevails when bycatch by one of the fleets 
equalizes zero. Therefore, it is the combined degree of bycatch that matters, and not each 
fleets’ individual level of bycatch. While this may seem surprising at first, intuitively, the 
combined degree of bycatch tells us which fleet is the most efficient at catching mature fish. 
This will be the fleet with the smallest proportion of immature fish in their total harvest, 
seeing as harvesting immatures is a cost to society as long as immature fish are more valuable 
when left in the ocean, than when harvested. Nevertheless, as shown in the numerical 
illustrations, the level of bycatch still affects the optimal level of harvesting.  
Suppose instead that it is optimal to utilize the trawler fleet and target the immature stock 
such that 1 > ℎ2,𝑡 > ℎ3,𝑡 = 0 holds irrespective of the fact that we still assume
3 33 2 23 1 22 23/ / /tw s w s s s   . Control condition (13) is then an equation and may be written 
as 𝑋2,𝑡(𝑤2 − 𝜌𝜆𝑡+1𝑠22 − 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠23) = −𝑋3,𝑡(𝑤3 − 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠33)𝛼3.  Combined with control 
condition (14) as an inequality written as 𝑋2,𝑡(𝑤2 − 𝜌𝜆𝑡+1𝑠22 − 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠23)𝛼2 <
−𝑋3,𝑡(𝑤3 − 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠33) , yields −𝑋3,𝑡(𝑤3 − 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠33)𝛼3 < −𝑋3,𝑡(𝑤3 − 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠33)/𝛼2.  This 
implies the bycatch restriction −𝛼3 < −1/𝛼2, or 2 3 1   , and hence a ‘high’ degree of 
bycatch. Recall that with 𝛼𝑖 > 1 the fishing mortality would be greater for the bycatch stock 
than for the target stock, indicating the gear’s selectivity is better suited to target the bycatch 
stock.  Thus, using the trawler fleet to target the immature cod stock combined with bycatch 
of mature fish will be optimal if the combined degree of bycatch is ‘high’. That is, if the 
trawler bycatch coefficient 3  is ‘high’ while at the same time the coastal fleet bycatch 
coefficient 2  is not too ‘low’ it is still optimal to harvest the mature stock, though utilizing a 
different gear. This is stated as: 
Result 5: In a situation with high proportion of bycatch by the trawler fleet and 2 3 1   , it is 
still optimal to prioritize to harvest the mature stock. The optimal harvest is then reached by 
utilizing the trawler fleet. 
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Thus, in a similar manner to Result 4, given the assumption that it is optimal to only harvest 
mature fish, it will also be optimal to utilize the fleet that achieves this in the most efficient 
manner.  
The effect of imperfect selectivity upon the optimal degree of exploitation is analysed in 
steady state with zero discount rent, which entails that the steady state of our dynamic 
problem coincides with the MSY problem (see above). We begin with the scenario where it is 
optimal to only utilize the coastal fleet to harvest mature fish; i.e., 2 3 1   .  By maximizing 
2 2 2 3 3 3 3Y w X h w X h  using a direct approach and omitting the shadow prices, we find that:  
(17) 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3/ ( ( / )) ( ( / )) 0Y h w X h X h w X h X h           ; 30 1h  ,  
describes the optimal harvest policy. Together with Eqs. (11) and (12), inserted for ℎ2 = 0, 
Eq. (17) define the MSY biomass, msyY . Because the trawler fleet does not harvest, 3 does 
not influence the conditions for optimum, and 
3/ 0
msyY     . On the other hand, 2  affects 
optimal yield directly through the stock, as well as indirectly through the optimal harvest 
policy. Harvested biomass may thus be written as 
2 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 2 3 2( , ( )) ( ) ( , ( )) ( )
msy msy msyY w X h h w X h h        . Through differentiation and the 











/𝜕𝛼2)]. The first term 2 2 3
msy msyw X h is the yield effect, 





/𝜕𝛼2)], in which higher harvesting pressure through 
increased bycatch shifts the spawning constraint up, while simultaneously shifting the 
recruitment constraint down, leads to smaller stock sizes. If the distortion effect is ‘large’ the 
presence of bycatch will reduce the yield compared to a situation without bycatch. In 
principle, we will also have the same counteracting forces present influencing the optimal 
yield *Y . This is stated as: 
Result 6: Bycatch may either increase or reduce the optimal yield *Y  and the maximum 
sustainable yield msyY .  
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To some extent, this may contradict intuition as joint production in the presence of bycatch, 
compared to perfect selectivity, could be interpreted as the replacement of a single good 
production without any additional effort, i.e. the fishing fleet is able to harvest more with the 
same amount of effort. On the other hand, bycatch implies that a fixed proportion of 
unintended catch is landed for every ton of intended catch. This reduces the flexibility of 
targeting age classes separately and the possibility of controlling the fish stocks in an optimal 
way (for a related discussion, see Skonhoft et al. 2012). In the numerical illustrations, this 
second effect dominates. In a parallel manner, the MSY biomass may be written as 
2 2 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 2( , ( )) ( , ( ))
msy msy msyB w X h w X h     . Differentiation yields  
2 2 2 2 3 3 2/ [ ( / ) ( / )]
msy msy msyB w X w X         
2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2[ ( / ) ( / )]( / )
msy msy msyw X h w X h h         . The first bracket term [.] is again the above 
mentioned negative distortion effect. The other bracket term 
2 2 3 3 3 3[ ( / ) ( / )]
msy msyw X h w X h     is also negative while we have not been able to find the sign 
of 
3 2/
msyh   .  However, in the numerical analysis this effect is also negative, 3 2/ 0
msyh   
, and the net effect
2/
msyB   is negative as well. Hence, the distortion effect dominates.  
In the scenario where 2 3 1a    and it is optimal to only utilize the trawler fleet, we also find 
that bycatch may either decrease or increase the maximum sustainable yield msyY .  Therefore, 
Result 6 prevail in this case as well. Moreover, because there is no harvest of the coastal fleet 
in this case, it is evident that the bycatch coefficient of the coastal fleet has no influence the 
optimality conditions and 
2/ 0
msyY    . 
7. Numerical illustrations 
7.1 Data and functional forms 
In order to capture the idea that recruits are subject to cannibalism by mature fish, and where 
the degree of cannibalism is density dependent, we apply the Shepherd recruitment function: 








with 𝜂 > 1 such that it describes a domed curve. More specifically 𝜂 is the compensation 
parameter which exhibits the degree to which density-dependent effects compensate for 
changes in the stock size. 𝑟 is the slope parameter indicating maximum recruitment per 
spawning individual, and 𝐾 is the threshold spawning stock size, above which the density-
dependent effects dominate density independent effects (King 1995). Therefore, while 
𝑟 indicates the reproduction capability, 𝐾 is scaling the population. Particularly, recruitment 
will be at its maximum when the stock of the matures is 𝑋3













 .  In line with the arguments of Shepherd (1982), we use 
𝜂 = 2.2 as the baseline value to illustrate the domed functional form of the recruitment 
function. Based on Diekert (2013) and the average weight of the fish in the mature stage class, 
𝐾 is set to 84 million individuals, whereas 𝑟 is adapted from Myers et al. (1997)7. The rest of 
the baseline parameter values are given in Table 2. The survival and transition parameters are 
calculated based on a natural mortality rate equal to 0.2 and the assumption that, each year, 
one fifth of the immatures transition to the mature stage class. Again, see the Appendix for a 
further discussion of these parameters. The weights, 𝑤2 and 𝑤3, are calculated as the 
weighted average of all harvestable age-classes in, respectively, the immature and mature 
stage class. Lastly, a discount rate of 5% is chosen, 0.05   .  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
7.2 Perfect Selectivity 
MATLAB R2016a is used to solve the model for a period of 50 years, though we exclude the last ten 
years to portray an infinite time horizon. Figure 5 first illustrates the dynamics of the system with 
perfect selectivity, and as expected from Result 1 only the mature stage class should be harvested, and 
where the steady state level is 
*
3 0.76h  . The harvesting rate of matures gradually increase over time, 
and population settles at a steady state after an adjustment period of 10-15 years. The length and 
nature of this adjustment period depends on the initial stock which was set to 40 mill individuals for 
each stage class. Both stocks, with the exception of an initial small reduction of the mature stock, also 
increase over time. This is parallel to the saddle point solution of the classical biomass fishery model 
                                                          
7 Number of recruits per spawner in Myers et al. (1997) is adjusted for the fact that not all individuals in the mature stage 
class are in fact mature enough to spawn (c.f. Figure 3 in section 2 where the degree of maturity at age 6 is 0.4). 
Concurrently, the parameter is adjusted with the weighted average percentage of spawners in the mature stage class.  
 
 23 
where natural growth dominates ahead of harvesting. Another set of initial conditions would yield the 
same steady state result, though with a different approach path.  
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Detailed steady state results are shown in Table 3. The condition 𝑤3/𝑠33 > (𝑤2 − 𝜌𝜆
∗𝑠22)/𝑠23  is 
confirmed to hold, albeit slightly, as 5.5 > 5.16, and where the shadow value of the recruitment 
constraint is 𝜆∗ = 𝑠23𝑤3/(1 − 𝜌𝑠22)𝑠33  = 2.25. Furthermore, in line with Result 2, the baseline 
optimum level of matures (𝑋3
∗) is located to the left of the recruitment function peak value (𝑋3
𝑚𝑎𝑥), 
which is at 77 million individuals. In a more conventional unit of measurement, the optimum steady 
state stock levels of immatures and matures are approximately 627 (284.98*2.2) and 248 (56.45*4.4) 
thousand tonnes, respectively.  As expected, a smaller discount rate (here zero) reduces the harvest 
rate and increases the stock of matures, and as discussed in section 5.3 this latter effect dominates with 
respect to optimal yield and biomass. Thus, the steady state maximum sustainable yield harvesting 
(MSY) and stock levels are therefore smaller and greater, respectively, than that of the steady state 
maximum yield (MY) (line two, Table 3). On the other hand, with a relatively high discount rate of 10 
percent we see that harvest of immatures should be prioritised. This regime switch can be traced back 
to the above inequality condition where the discount rate both has a direct effect, as well as an indirect 
effect through the shadow value 𝜆∗so that the sign of this inequality changes to 
*
3 33 2 22 23/ ( ) /w s w s s  . Therefore, in our case with a discount rate of 10 percent it is not 
beneficial to wait for the fish to grow and double its weight. In accordance with Result 3, the weights 
do not affect harvesting or stock levels, unless the weight difference becomes too small for the 
baseline inequality condition to hold, at which point harvest of the immatures is preferred. For the 
results shown here, this happens when 𝑤2 = 3 (kg/fish) (line five, Table 3).  
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE  
The parameters in the recruitment function have no direct influence on harvesting priority; that is, 
which of the stocks should be targeted. However, they influence the harvest level and the stock sizes 




1 ( 1)( / )
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, and where 
3'( )R X  is determined and fixed through the optimality conditions (section 5.3), we hence find that a 
smaller maximum recruitment per spawning individual 𝑟 is consistent with a smaller mature stock size 




) 𝑅(𝑋3) when ℎ2
∗ = 0 (see also section 5.2 above), a reduction in both 𝑟 and 𝑋3 (given that 𝑋3 
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initially is to the left of the peak value) spills over to a relatively large decrease in the stock of 
immature fish. Due to the dual effect upon 𝑋2, the number of immature fish is reduced at a greater 
proportion than the number of mature fish and thus according to the spawning constraint (3’) 𝑋3 =
𝑠23𝑋2 + 𝑠33(1 − ℎ3)𝑋3 the harvest rate of matures is decreased (line eight, Table 3).  
With reduced value of the compensation parameter and assuming 𝜂 = 1.1, we still have the domed 
curve of Ricker, though with weaker density effects, which may be interpreted as less cannibalism. In 
this case we get a somewhat higher steady state stock of both immatures and matures, correspondingly 
the harvesting rate ℎ3 is reduced. As mentioned 𝐾 acts as a scaling parameter and thus a greater 
threshold level indicates that the mature stock size must increase in the same proportion to keep 
3'( )R X  fixed. Again, from Eq. (4’), it is also then evident that 
*
2X  must change in the same 
proportion as 
*
3X  to keep 3'( )R X  fixed. When the stock sizes change in the same proportion it is 
furthermore clear from Eq. (3’) that the fishing mortality 
*
3h  will stay unchanged such that we still 
have
*
3 0.76h   (line seven).  
Finally, Table 3 includes results that follow from greater natural mortality, which is captured by 
lowering the combined survival and transition parameters, 𝑠12,  𝑠22 , 𝑠23 and 𝑠33 (see Appendix). Here 
too, the regime switch is easily explained by the inequality 𝑤3/𝑤2 > (𝑠33(1 − 𝜌𝑠22))/𝑠23. When 
inserting for the survival and transition parameters as defined in the Appendix it is obvious that greater 
natural mortality requires a larger weight difference for the harvest of matures to still be optimal. In a 
similar manner, we find that a smaller proportion of individuals that transition from the immature to 
the mature stage class also require a greater weight difference for the matures to be prioritised.  
7.3 Imperfect Selectivity 
With 𝑤3/𝑠33 > (𝑤2 − 𝜌𝜆
∗𝑠22)/𝑠23, as predicted by Results 4 and 5, it is always optimal to prioritise 
the harvest of mature fish. When the combined degree of bycatch is less than one ( 2 3 1   ) it is 
optimal to do so using the coastal fleet, whereas the trawler fleet is the most efficient when the 
combined degree of bycatch is greater than one ( 2 3 1   ).  Figure 6 demonstrates the transitional 
dynamics in these two cases with the baseline parameter values and the same initial stock sizes as 
above. The harvest rates increase gradually also when there is imperfect selectivity. Figure 6 reveals 
that steady state harvesting rates drop compared to the baseline scenario of perfect selectivity. This 
was suggested in the theoretical analysis leading up to Result 6, and it follows intuitively from the fact 
that for each unit of harvesting effort there will be some bycatch in addition to the target stock. Thus, 
in order not to overexploit the resource, it is optimal to reduce the steady state harvest rate.  
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FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
Detailed steady state results are shown in Table 4, where we see that bycatch reduce the optimal 
harvest rate in all considered cases. Further, bycatch decreases the stock of immatures while the stock 
of matures is unchanged. However, we have not been able to show this analytically8. The numerical 
illustrations reveal that while the introduction of bycatch increase the total number of fish caught, the 
distortion effect dominates and 𝜕𝑌𝑚𝑠𝑦/𝜕𝛼𝑖  < 0 as well as 𝜕𝑌
∗/𝜕𝛼𝑖  < 0 (𝑖 = 1,2) hold due to the 
weight difference, i.e. 𝑤3 > 𝑤2. Moreover, when 𝛼2𝛼3 < 1 there is, as expected, no effect of 𝛼3 as 
ℎ2
∗ = 0, hence with a combined degree of bycatch less than one it is the bycatch of the coastal fleet 
𝛼2 that dictates the outcome (lines four and five, Table 4). When 𝛼2 = 1, there is no real selectivity as 
𝑓3 = 𝑓2 = ℎ3 . However, when the trawler fleet still has some selectivity in favour of immatures only 
the coastal fleet is utilized. As indicated (section 6), when the combined degree of bycatch is one there 
is one degree of freedom in the system and both fleets may be utilised. In the case presented here 𝛼2 =
𝛼3 = 1, implying that neither fleet has any selectivity, and thus it should not matter how the harvest is 
distributed between the two fleets (line six). Moreover, this suggest that optimal total fishing mortality 
is 0.26 and the set of optimal harvesting combinations is determined by 𝑓2 = 𝑓3 = ℎ2 + ℎ3 = 0.26. 
Similarly, for 𝛼2𝛼3 > 1, changing 𝛼2 does not affect the outcome and the case of 𝛼3 = 1, is 
equivalent to the above combination of 𝛼2𝛼3 < 1 and 𝛼2 = 1; one harvesting fleet with no real 
selectivity and thus   𝑓3 = 𝑓2 = ℎ2. When instead increasing the trawler fleet’s bycatch there is quite 
naturally a decrease in the harvest rate as one unit of harvesting effort now yields a greater return of 
the byacatch stock, mature fish. These results therefore shed some light on aspects not discovered in 
the analytical section; it is evident that while it is the combined degree of bycatch that determines 
which stock should be harvested, each of the fleets’ individual rates of bycatch do affect the level of 
harvesting.  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
8. Sharing the fish stocks 
As demonstrated above, ℎ2,𝑡 = 0 and 3,0 1th   represents the perfect selectivity yield 
maximizing, given the condition 3 33 2 23 1 22 23/ / /tw s w s s s   . Only utilizing the coastal 
fleet will also represent the optimal fishing policy with imperfect fishing selectivity when the 
bycatch is restricted as defined by 𝛼2𝛼3 < 1. On the other hand, with 𝛼2𝛼3 > 1 it is optimal 
                                                          
8 The same also happens when studying the effects of changing sharing rule. Under this harvesting scheme, 
however, we are able to show this effect analytically. See Result 8 and Table 5 below. 
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to only use the trawler fleet such that ℎ3,𝑡 = 0. Thus, although the degree of selectivity affects 
which stage class it is optimal to target, it is generally not optimal to target both stage classes 
simultaneously, except when the combined degree of bycatch equals one.  
The Norwegian share of the NEA cod is allocated between trawlers and the coastal fleet 
according to a sharing rule known as the trawl ladder. Although it varies according to the size 
of the TAC, the biomass share of the coastal fleet is always greater than that of the trawlers. 
According to our findings, a sharing rule imposes a non-optimal harvesting regime, and in 
order to study the implications of this we introduce a sharing rule in the form of a constraint 
on our problem. Assume the sharing rule allocates a certain fraction 0 < 𝛾 ≤ 1 of the coastal 
fleet’s yearly harvested biomass to the trawlers, i.e. the fleet harvesting the immature stock. 
While only the perfect selectivity case is analysed analytically, both perfect and imperfect 
selectivity are examined in the numerical illustrations. Hence, with perfect fishing selectivity, 
the distributional constraint imposed by the trawl share is stated as: 
(19) 2 2, 2, 3 3, 3,t t t tw X h w X h .  
With 0t  as the shadow price reflecting this distributional constraint, the Lagrangian of 
this new yield maximizing problem is written as  
𝐿 = ∑ 𝜌𝑡{(𝑤2ℎ2,𝑡𝑋2,𝑡
∞
𝑡=0 + 𝑤3ℎ3,𝑡𝑋3,𝑡) − 𝜌𝜆𝑡+1[𝑋2,𝑡+1 − 𝑠12𝑅(𝑋3,𝑡) − 𝑠22(1 − ℎ2,𝑡)𝑋2,𝑡] −
𝜌𝜇𝑡+1[𝑋3,𝑡+1 − 𝑠23(1 − ℎ2,𝑡)𝑋2,𝑡 − 𝑠33(1 − ℎ3,𝑡)𝑋3,𝑡] − 𝜑𝑡[𝛾𝑤3𝑋3,𝑡ℎ3,𝑡 − 𝑤2𝑋2,𝑡ℎ2,𝑡]}. 
The optimal first order conditions are now:  
(20) (𝜕𝐿/𝜕ℎ2,𝑡)/𝜌
𝑡 = 𝑋2,𝑡(𝑤2 − 𝜌𝜆𝑡+1𝑠22 − 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠23 + 𝜑𝑡𝑤2) = 0; 0 < ℎ2,𝑡 < 1, 𝑡 =
0,1,2 … , 
 (21) (𝜕𝐿/𝜕ℎ3,𝑡)/𝜌
𝑡 = 𝑋3,𝑡(𝑤3 − 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠33 − 𝜑𝑡𝛾𝑤3) = 0; 0 < ℎ3,𝑡 < 1, 𝑡 = 0,1,2 … . 
(22) (𝜕𝐿/𝜕𝑋2,𝑡)/𝜌
𝑡 = 𝑤2ℎ2,𝑡 − 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜌𝜆𝑡+1𝑠22(1 − ℎ2) + 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠23(1 − ℎ2) + 𝜑𝑤2ℎ2,𝑡 =




𝑡 = 𝑤3ℎ3,𝑡 + 𝜌𝜆𝑡+1𝑠12𝑅
′(𝑋3,𝑡) − 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1𝑠33(1 − ℎ3) −
𝜑𝛾𝑤3ℎ3,𝑡 = 0;  𝑡 = 1,2,3 … . 
















) = 𝜌𝜇𝑡+1. The distributional constraint operates as a cost factor 
imposing a positive unit cost on the coastal fleet and a negative unit cost, or a subsidy, on the 
trawler fleet. Concurrently, although we study the maximum yield problem and not that of 
MEY, costs in terms of biomass will be higher with the existence of a sharing rule, indicating 
inefficiency.  This is stated as: 
Result 7: The distributional constraint inherent in the sharing rule has a two-fold effect. For 
the costal fleet it operates as a negative unit cost, whereas it for the trawler fleet acts as a unit 
subsidy.  
In steady state condition (21) may be written as 𝜇 =
𝑤3(1−𝜑𝛾)
𝜌𝑠33
, indicating that the shadow 
value (kg/fish) of the mature stock is lower when there is a distributional constraint. 
Additionally, condition (20) can be used to show that immatures are more valuable compared 
to the situation without a distributional constraint; that is, 𝜆 =
1
𝜌𝑠22
(𝑤2(1 + 𝜑) −
𝑤3(1−𝜑𝛾)𝑠23
𝑠33
). By using Eq. (22), the shadow price of the distribution constraint can be written 
as 𝜑 = (𝑤2(1 − 𝜌𝑠22) −
𝑠23
𝑠33
𝑤3)/(𝑤2(𝜌𝑠22 − 1) −
𝑠23
𝑠33
𝑤3𝛾). Next, the shadow values may be 
inserted into Eq. (23) where after some rearrangements the harvest rate cancels out, and we 




That is, the identical outcome as when no distributional constraint was included (section 5.3 
above). Therefore, the size of the optimized mature stock 𝑋3 is independent of the 
distributional constraint. This is stated as: 
Result 8: The optimal steady state stock of matures is independent of the harvesting share 
allocated to the fleet targeting immatures.  
This is indeed a surprising result, but while 3X  is unaffected by the trawler harvesting share, 
it is evident from Eq. (3’) that 2X  as well as the harvest rate of the immatures will be 
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influenced. More precisely, there must exist an exact trade-off between the harvest induced 
reduction in the stock of immatures and thus the number of individuals that transfer to the 
mature stage class, and the reduction in the harvest rate of matures, hence leaving the stock of 
matures unchanged. 
How the trawler’s share influence yield is again analysed in steady state with zero discount 
rent, i.e. in the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) scenario. Based on the direct approach and 
omitting the shadow prices (see section 6 above), MSY may now be expressed as 
2 2 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 3( ( ), ( ), ) ( ) ( ( ), ( )) ( )
msy msy msyY w X h h h w X h h h        when Result 8 is taken into 
account such that the distributional constraint has no direct effect on the mature stock size. 
Differentiating with respect to   and using the envelope theorem, we have 
2 2 2/ ( / )
msy msy msyY w X h      .  With 2 / 0
msyX    we find / 0
msyY    , which is expected 
as any 𝛾 > 0 is assumed to be non-optimal. Figure 7 illustrates for the original maximum 
yield (MY) problem where the total steady state yield declines quite modestly as a higher 
harvesting share is allocated to the trawler fleet.  When half of the fished biomass is allocated 
to the trawler fleet, 0.50  , the maximum biomass yield is about 94 % of the yield without 
any sharing constraint. Again, the decline in biomass is driven by the weight difference 
between immatures and matures, as the total number of fish caught increase. However, the 
modest effect can also be traced back to the stage based formulation of our model and the 
large differences between the pure survival rate 
33s  and the survival rates also reflecting 
transition between the immature and mature stages (section 5.2 and Appendix). 
FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE 
Table 5 gives more detailed numerical results, and where Result 7 is mirrored through the cost 
effect of the sharing rule that reduces the optimal harvest rate of matures, while the subsidy 
effect increases the harvest rate of immatures. Additionally, the stock of matures remain 
unaffected, as predicted by Result 8.  
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
In Table 6 the numerical illustrations including imperfect perfect selectivity are presented 
with the sharing fraction 0.5  . When the combined degree of bycatch is less than one, 
harvesting rates are less than without bycatch, yet the same pattern may be identified. These 
numerical results reveal that the distributional constraint does not bind when the combined 
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degree of bycatch is above one. This follows from the fact that the distributional constraint 
does not secure a minimum fraction of harvest for the coastal fleet, and when combined 
bycatch is above one it is as demonstrated optimal to only utilize the trawler fleet.   
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
9. Concluding remarks 
Using a stage structured model with a domed Shepherd recruitment function we have studied 
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and maximum yield (MY), as well as optimal harvest 
composition in a fishery with two heterogeneous fleets. The stage model developed here 
bundles the age classes into stage classes based on their level of maturity, but also the pattern 
according to which they are harvested. There are two stages included in the harvestable stock; 
immatures and matures. In many fisheries, as in the Northeast Arctic (NEA) cod fishery, it is 
a clear distinction between coastal and high-sea fishing. In the NEA fishery, the coastal fleet 
mainly targets mature cod while the high-sea trawler fleet targets immature cod. This study 
considers both perfect selectivity (pure mature and immature catches) and mixed catches in 
the two fleets. In the case of perfect selectivity, it is optimal only to harvest mature cod and 
invest the immature cod in the coastal fishery. The simple rational behind is that the surviving 
cod reaches a higher total biomass after maturation. It also demands a certain restriction in the 
variation of survival and transition rates among the different stages. This is in contrast to age 
structured models where these rates are pure survival rates. Moreover, we find that it is 
optimal to harvest to such an extent that cannibalism is curbed. This result remains after 
introducing imperfect fishing selectivity and mixed catches. In this case it may however be 
optimal to utilise both fleets depending on the selective properties of the fishing gear. At 
moderate levels of bycatch it is still optimal to utilize the coastal fleet while the trawler fleet 
is more efficient at higher bycatch levels. In all fishing schemes with the baseline parameter 
values the optimal solution is to prioritise harvest of the mature fraction of the stock. This 
study also shows that sharing rules that implicitly or explicitly entail the harvest of both 
immature and mature cod generate efficiency losses. However, following our numerical 
illustrations the losses is quite small which basically hinges on the stage based model 
formulation with large differences between pure survival rates and survival rates also 
reflecting transition between the immature and mature stages. We also find that while the size 
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of the sharing rule influences the optimal harvest of the immature stock as well as the harvest 
rates while the size of the mature stock is unaffected.   
Fishing costs and the concept of maximum economic yield (MEY) have not been analysed in 
this study. If costs should be introduced our results would tend to be more ambiguous. With a 
higher unit cost of harvest in the costal fleet than in the trawler fleet our main findings may be 
reversed from prioritising catch of mature cod to giving priority of targeting immature cod. 
However, in the NEA cod fishery the cost structure seems to be in line with our results; that 
is, the unit cost of harvesting is less for the coastal fleet than for the trawler fleet (Inarra and 
Skonhoft 2008; Sumaila 1997). There seems also to be a price premium for mature fish as the 
market price per kg typically is higher for larger fish than smaller fish (Armstrong and 
Sumaila 2000; Zimmermann et al. 2011). Additionally, there are relevant external costs not 
taken into account in the present analysis, including the potential evolutionary consequences 
of selective harvesting (e.g., Olsen et al. 2004), and certain costs that most likely is higher for 
the trawlers than for the coastal fleet. Such costs include the carbon footprint of the vessel 
groups, where the coastal fleets are more fuel-efficient than trawlers. While Norwegian 
handline and gillnet boats on average use 0.15 litre diesel per kilo fish harvested, the 
Norwegian bottom trawlers use 0.43 (Winther et al. 2009). Another externality that may be of 
importance is the well-known potential habitat damage from bottom trawling.  
Appendix 
Survival and transition parameters 
The so-called survival and transition parameters exhibit the individual’s movement through 
the different stage classes. Let 𝑚𝑖 denote natural mortality of stage 𝑖, such that the probability 
of surviving one year in stage i is (1 − 𝑚𝑖). Furthermore, we follow the example of Getz and 
Haight (1989) and let 0 < 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 1 denote the proportion of individuals in stage class i that 
move into stage class 𝑖 + 1 in the time interval (𝑡, 𝑡 + 1). Accordingly, (1 − 𝑝𝑖) is the 
proportion that remain in stage class i an additional year. This information enables the 
construction of the composite survival and transformation parameters. 
The pure survival rates; the proportion of individuals that survive the time interval (t, t+1) 
and remain within their stage class i, is defined as: 
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(A1) 𝑠𝑖𝑖 = (1 − 𝑝𝑖)(1 − 𝑚𝑖). 
The survival and transition parameters; the proportion of individuals that survive the time 
interval (t, t+1) and move on to the next stage class i+1, is accordingly defined as: 
(A2) 𝑠𝑖,𝑖+1 = 𝑝𝑖(1 − 𝑚𝑖). 
The stage class of immature fish consist of five age classes; that is. fish of age 1, 2,3,4 and 5 
years. Thus, one might assume that approximately one fifth (1/5) of the immatures move into 
the mature stage class each year such that 𝑝2 = 0.2. As an example, consider 𝑠33 and 𝑠23 as 
these prove to be crucial to the above discussion (section 5.1). First, 𝑠23 is the proportion of 
immatures that survive the one year period (t, t+1) and move on to the mature stage class. 
Thus, the parameter is determined by 𝑝2 and 𝑚2, the natural mortality of immatures. In line 
with Anon (2016) natural mortality for all stage classes is 0.2 and hence we have 𝑠23 = 0.2 ∗
(1 − 0.2) = 0.16.  Secondly, as the mature class is the final stage class there is no more 
transition (𝑝3 = 0) and  𝑠33 is a pure survival rate, i.e. it is the proportion of matures that 
survive the one year period (t, t+1).  Correspondingly 𝑠33 = (1 − 0) ∗ (1 − 0.2) = 0.8, and 
thus it is shown that the difference between 
33s  and 23s  is quite substantial.  
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Figure 3. Maturation level at age in different year classes of NEA cod (left panel) and individual length at age 
by year classes (right panel). Length data for year classes before 1980 was not available. The thick horizontal 
line in the right panel indicates the current minimum size (44 cm fish length) in the cod fishery regulation (Data 







Figure 4. Biological equilibrium with fixed fishing mortalities. The spawning constraint Eq. (3’) and recruitment 











Figure 6. Transitional dynamics imperfect selectivity. Baseline parameter values. 𝛼2𝛼3 < 1 with 𝛼2 = 0.2 and 





Figure 7. Steady state maximum yield (MY) and the trawler share. Baseline parameter values. 
 
 
Table 1. Steady state comparative statics. Perfect selectivity. 
 
2w  3w    s  
*
3h  0  0  + - 
*
2X  0  0  - + 
*
3X  0  0  - + 
*Y  0 + ? + 
*B  + + - + 













0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1
Total yield (in 
thousand tonnes)
𝛾, trawler share of the coastal fleet's harvested biomass 
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Table 2. Biological and economic baseline parameter values. 
Parameter Description Value Source 
12s  Natural survival rate recruits. 0.80 Anon. (2016) 
22s  
Proportion that survives and 
remain in the immature stage class  
0.64 
Based on Anon. 
(2016) 
23s  
Proportion that survives and 
transition from immatures to 
matures  
0.16 
Based on Anon. 
(2016) 
33s  Natural survival rate matures. 0.80 Anon. (2016) 
𝜂 Compensation parameter 2.2 
Based on Shepherd 
(1982) 
𝑟 
Number of recruits per mature 
individual 
3.2 
Myers et al. (1997) 
and Anon. (2016) 
𝐾 
Recruitment function threshold 
level 
84 (# million 
individuals) 
Diekert (2013) 
2w  Weight (average) immature fish 2.2
1  (kg/fish) Anon. (2016) 
3w  Weight (average) mature fish 4.4
1 (kg/fish) Anon. (2016) 
𝛿 Discount rate 0.05 Assumed 
1Average weight of catches over ten years (2006-2015) 
 
 





















Baseline 0.00 0.76 284.98 56.45 188.69 875.32 
MSY (𝜹 = 𝟎) 0.00 0.70 292.63 61.52 189.84 914.47 
𝛿 = 0.1  0.54 0.00 139.68 51.17 165.84 532.43 
𝑤3 = 5 𝑘𝑔  0.00 0.76 284.97 56.45 300.17 1022.08 
𝑤2 = 3 𝑘𝑔  0.52 0.00 147.74 56.45 385.89 987.08 
𝜂 = 1.1  0.00 0.50 288.97 77.22 169.36 975.49 
𝐾 = 150  0.00 0.76 508.88 100.80 336.92 1563.04 
𝑟 = 1.5  0.00 0.31 111.70 40.09 54.20 422.12 
𝑠12 = 𝑠33 = 0.7; 𝑠22
= 0.57; 𝑠23 = 0.14
𝑎 0.31 0.00 122.37 39.57 82.65 443.33 
𝑠12 = 𝑠33 = 0.8; 𝑠22
= 0.72; 𝑠23 = 0.08
𝑏 0.34 0.00 180.32 47.34 135.66 605.01 
Table notes; 𝑎: Survival and transition parameters when natural mortality is increased.  
𝑏: Survival and transition parameters when the yearly proportion of individuals that transition from the immature 
































Baseline 0 0 0.00 0.76 284.98 56.45 188.69 875.32 
0.2 0.2 1 0.00 0.51 241.07 56.45 182.47 778.73 
0.5 0.5 1 0.00 0.37 214.73 56.45 178.78 720.79 
0.2 1 0.2 0.00 0.26 194.95 56.45 176.23 677.26 
0.5 1 0.5 0.00 0.26 194.96 56.45 176.19 677.29 
1 1 1 0.13 0.13 195.00 56.45 176.14 677.37 
1.5 1.5 1 0.26 0.00 194.95 56.45 176.21 677.28 
2 2 1 0.26 0.00 194.97 56.45 176.24 677.32 
1.5 1 1.5 0.22 0.00 206.29 56.45 177.74 702.21 

























tonnes, fraction of 





tonnes, fraction of 
total in brackets) 
0 0.00 0.76 284.97 56.45 188.68 0.00 (0.00) 188.68 (1) 
0.10 0.03 0.68 271.26 56.45 186.82 16.98 (0.09) 169.84 (0.91) 
0.30 0.08 0.57 250.67 56.45 184.01 42.46 (0.23) 141.54 (0.77) 
0.50 0.12 0.49 235.97 56.45 181.94 60.65 (0.33) 121.29 (0.67) 
0.70 0.15 0.43 224.94 56.45 180.43 74.29 (0.41) 106.13 (0.59) 
0.90 0.18 0.38 216.36 56.45 179.24 84.90 (0.47) 94.34 (0.53) 































𝛼2𝛼3 = 0 0.12 0.49 235.97 56.45 181.94 767.50 
𝛼2𝛼3 < 1 0.09 0.35 223.01 56.45 180.19 739.36 
𝛼2𝛼3 > 1 0.22 0.00 206.28 56.45 177.86 702.66 
Table note: 𝛼2𝛼3 < 1 with 𝛼2 = 0.2 and 𝛼3 = 0.5. 𝛼2𝛼3 > 1 with 𝛼2 = 0.8 and 𝛼3 = 1.5.    
 
 
